Newjobs for high speed railway contractor consortium 13 in Indonesia available today on JobStreet - Quality Candidates, Quality Employers Basic Information Name Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed RailwayLocation Jakarta to Bandung, West Java Province, IndonesiaType of Project TransportationProject Developers PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China KCIC, a 60–40 joint venture between a consortium of Indonesian state-owned enterprises SOEs through PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN PSBI and a consortium of Chinese SOEs through Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd. PSBI comprises PT Wijaya Karya, PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII, PT Kereta Api Indonesia, and PT Jasa Yawan HSR comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd a subsidiary of China State Railway Group Co. Ltd, CR, China Railway Group Limited known as CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, CRRC Corporation Limited CRRC, and China Railway Signal and Communication Corporation CRSC. Main Contractors High-Speed Railway Contractor Consortium HSRCC, a consortium between Indonesian company PT Wijaya Karya 30% and several Chinese companies 70%, including China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited, China Railway Design Corporation another subsidiary of CR, CRRC Sifang Co. Ltd a subsidiary of CRRC, and Financiers China Development BankCost billion USD estimate as of 2021, from an initial estimate of billion USDProject Status Under construction Project Outline The idea of a fast train project in Indonesia dates back to 2011, when the Japanese International Cooperation Agency JICA together with the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning Bappenas carried out a feasibility study for a possible Jakarta–Surabaya HSR, the first phase of which would connect Jakarta to Bandung. The Jakarta–Surabaya medium–high-speed railway was listed as a priority project in 2013. The original plan did not explicitly mention the Jakarta–Bandung HSR, but it suggested the Jakarta–Cirebon route via Bandung section would be prioritised in part due to its higher economic internal rate of return. However, when President Joko Widodo Jokowi came to power in 2014, he shelved the plan to build the railway and reallocated the budget to development projects outside Java. Much to the surprise of everyone, not least the Japanese, in March 2015, Jokowi asked both Japan and China to bid for the Jakarta–Bandung section of the railway. In September 2015, both countries presented their proposals, which were relatively balanced. The Japanese proposed five stations along a 140-kilometre track that is part of the Jakarta–Cirebon route, while the Chinese side planned eight stations along a 150-kilometre track. Though China had a higher interest rate of 2% compared with Japan’s China offered a longer maturity period for the loan 50 years as opposed to 40 years, a shorter time frame for completion of the project, and waived the state guarantee. After a fierce bidding war between China and Japan over the project, which China won, Indonesian Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Rini Soemarno was given a mandate to determine the fate of the railway, including the establishment of the joint-venture company to lead the project. In September 2015, a state-owned fast train consortium was formed, named PT Indonesia China Fast Train or Kereta Cepat Indonesia China, KCIC. KCIC is a consortium of Indonesian and Chinese SOEs. Indonesia is represented by PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN Indonesia PSBI, a consortium of four SOEs—namely, PT Wijaya Karya 38%, active in construction, PT Jasa Marga 12%, toll road builder, PT Kereta Api Indonesia 25%, railways, and PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII 25%, plantations. Meanwhile, the Chinese side is represented by a consortium led by Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd, which comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, China Railway Design Corporation, CRRC Corporation Limited, and China Railway Signal & Communication Corporation. The initial deal included debt financing from the China Development Bank CDB—for 75% of the total billion USD cost—which was granted with a 10-year grace period and a 2% interest rate for the dollar-denominated loan. The remaining 25% of the project’s cost will be funded by equity provided by KCIC. After the establishment of KCIC, the railway route was revised. The train was expected to reduce the 142-kilometre trip between Jakarta and Bandung from three hours to less than 40 minutes, with a maximum speed of 350 km/h. Four main stations are planned along the route Halim East Jakarta, Karawang West Java, Walini West Java, and Tegalluar West Java. Project Developer Project Contractor Soon after the establishment of KCIC, the ground-breaking ceremony for the Jakarta–Bandung HSR was held in Walini, West Java Province, in the presence of President Jokowi, on 21 January 2016. However, the project was already embroiled in controversy, with critics expressing concerns over the risk of default and the irregularities in the concession of the building permit. Then Transport Minister Ignasius Jonan did not attend the ceremony, and instead became one of the staunchest critics of the project. On 26 January, Jonan revealed that he had not issued the railway infrastructure operation permit as his ministry was still waiting for the required documents and negotiating basic terms for the concession agreement with KCIC. Despite the lack of permits and support from key ministries and lawmakers, in late January 2016, Jokowi issued a regulation containing a list of about 200 strategic projects including the HSR, signalling the strong backing of and attention from his office for this project. Many pundits believe that by backing the project, Jokowi was attempting to build his political legitimacy, with the project connecting the two largest metropolitan areas and located in the most populated province in Indonesia, cementing Jokowi’s claim to be the country’s Infrastructure Father’. From this point of view, China’s initial commitment to complete the project before 2019 was critical to Jokowi’s government as it provided the president with political capital for his campaign for re-election that year. After several delays, including a stoppage owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, construction of the railway fell way behind schedule. As of December 2020, the project was said to be 64% complete. In April 2021, Indonesian media quoted senior management at KCIC as saying the project would be operational by the end of 2022. In May 2021, President Jokowi inspected the project during his visit to West Java Province and announced the project was 73% complete, with trial runs expected to commence at the end of 2022. Source Drawn by the author. Project Impacts Land The delay in loan disbursement was one of the main factors that impeded construction of the HSR from 2016 to 2018, due to inadequate preparation in the land acquisition According to local nongovernmental organisation NGO Indonesian Forum for the Environment Walhi, project construction has caused flooded roads, landslides, and damaged houses in part due to shoddy management and poor environmental protection procedures. As the planned route of the railway cuts through important water catchment areas, mountainous regions, and agricultural areas, the project has also impacted water supplies and caused environmental stress to the surrounding impact Due to poor preparation and multiple technical challenges, the project has incurred cost overruns. In 2017, the budget swelled from billion USD to billion USD. Economists and policymakers have questioned the viability of the project, worrying it will drag Indonesia into a debt trap. Employment and labour rights The project was expected to create 39,000 jobs—both casual and permanent—during its three-year construction phase, but no data are available to show whether this promise has been fulfilled. Meanwhile, for its operation, KCIC is set to offer 2,400 local jobs and the recruitment process was under way as of April 2021. The Jakarta–Bandung HSR has led to various concerns regarding the financial sustainability of the KCIC and Indonesian SOEs in general. With Indonesian finance accounting for a major share of total investment in the project 60%, economists and policymakers voiced concerns about whether the country was at high risk of falling into debt distress. This was especially so because the Indonesian SOEs joining the consortium are debt-heavy entities and, before the inception of KCIC, were already struggling to meet their repayment obligations. To develop these major projects, the SOEs are frontloaded with debt and will only get cash flow back years into the future, which is why delays are so costly. Some Members of Parliament called on the government to halt the project amid increased concerns that a bailout would be necessary should KCIC default on its debt. In particular, Prabowo Subianto, a challenger to Jokowi’s presidency during the 2019 general election, built his campaign on the claim that Indonesia’s economic shortfalls were due to Chinese exploitation, and he even staged a protest against the HSR. As part of the campaign, Prabowo’s team promised to renegotiate—if not cancel—the project, claiming that Indonesia must get a better deal’, given that Chinese investment had eroded national interests. During the COVID-19 pandemic, pundits and the media regularly questioned the project’s sustainability. In June 2020, the Jokowi government began discussions with Japan to join the project and suggested integrating the Chinese-built HSR with a separate Japanese-funded railway project linking Jakarta and Surabaya along a different route. Some in the Indonesian Government argued that only by integrating the two projects could they both become economically viable. However, integration would be difficult as the Japanese-built section uses a different railway gauge and speeds. The restructuring of KCIC management and the appointment of a new chief executive in March 2021 have been interpreted as clear signs of the worsening financial outlook for the company. Adding to this, the following month, Indonesian SOEs also suggested that China take up a larger stake in the project to bear the cost overrun. This remains unresolved and, according to the corporate secretary of KCIC, who was quoted by Reuters in April 2021 Until now, details regarding additional unexpected costs are still being discussed and negotiated at the shareholder level. Also, consultations between the Government of Indonesia and China are continuing.’ According to an interview conducted by the author with one human resources manager, KCIC has employed a majority of local staff in the construction of the project, but top-level management is mostly dominated by Chinese expatriates, despite the fact the Indonesian side has a 60% share in the consortium. KCIC also claimed it has provided vocational training for domestic staff and local engineers to become the first HSR technicians’ in Southeast Asia. While generating more than 2,400 job opportunities, the project has faced multiple problems and technical challenges in its construction phase. In April 2016, vendors tasked by KCIC to carry out land investigations—including five Chinese nationals—were detained by the Indonesian Air Force for trespassing at the Halim Perdanakusuma Airport. In October 2019, a construction mishap caused Indonesia’s state-owned Pertamina oil pipeline to erupt in flames. In January 2020, the breach of an embankment allegedly caused by KCIC led to flooding in the West Bandung Regency. In March 2020, flooding caused by improper landfill and waste dumping blocked the Jakarta–Cikampek toll road, which is one of the busiest routes in the greater Jakarta region. These incidents have sparked public suspicion about the quality of the project’s technical assessment, given the environmental impact assessment AMDAL was completed in just seven days before the ground-breaking ceremony, according to NGO Walhi, which has been questioning the AMDAL submitted by KCIC since early 2016. Following the recent construction mishaps and environmental degradation caused by the project, Walhi staged a series of protests demanding the Indonesian Government and KCIC reassess the project, but they have been met with no response. The project continues without any further information being made public about plans to revisit the AMDAL or actions to minimise the risks. The land acquisition process has been no less problematic. Although KCIC secured a concession for the project in April 2016, progress was slow in the first two years. The inadequate preparation of land acquisition procedures and the involvement of ill-informed Chinese companies that overlooked the complexity of landownership in Indonesia have led to many controversies. There was a tendency on the part of the Chinese companies to assume public ownership of all land, as is the case in China. Moreover, the CDB made funding conditional on Indonesia securing all the land needed for the railway, making the delay even more challenging. Acquisition of land for the project finally reached 99% in late 2019, after the Indonesian Government intervened in the process. In-Depth Sources Belt and Road Podcast. 2021. Easy Money is Rarely Easy Jessica Liao on Infrastructure Financing and Export Credit Agencies.’ Belt and Road Podcast, 21 January. Link. Camba, Alvin. 2020. Derailing development China’s railway projects and financing coalitions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. GCI Working Paper 008. Global Development Policy Center, Boston University. Link. Friends of the Earth US. 2017. Investing in a Green Belt and Road? Assessing the Implementation of China’s Green Credit Guidelines Abroad. Washington, DC Friends of the Earth US. Link in English; Link in Chinese. Liao, Jessica C. 2020. Easy Money and Political Opportunism How China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition in Indonesia Drives Financially Risky Projects.’ Panda Paw Dragon Claw, 21 December. Link. Liao, Jessica C. and Saori N. Katada. 2020. Geoeconomics, Easy Money, and Political Opportunism The Perils under China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition.’ Contemporary Politics 271 1–22. Lim, Guanie, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra. 2021. Why Is It So Hard to Push Chinese Railway Projects in Southeast Asia? The Role of Domestic Politics in Malaysia and Indonesia.’ World Development 138. Link. Salim, Wilmar and Siwage Dharma Negara. 2016. Why is the high speed rail project so important to Indonesia? ISEAS PerspectiveNo. 16. Singapore ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Link. Tritto, Angela. 2020. Contentious Embeddedness Chinese State Capital and the Belt and Road Initiative in Indonesia.’ Made in China Journal 51 182–87. Featured Image Credits muhammadpascalfajrin CC, on Indonesias and Southeast Asia's first high-speed rail project is expected to connect the country's largest cities of Jakarta and Bandung, the capital of West Java, covering a distance approaching 142.3 kilometres. As of March 2021, PT KCIC stated that the construction of the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail has reached 70 percent and is expected to be completed by the end of 2022. No trains can run until track construction is completed. Plans and studies have been in the works for high-speed rai A consortium made up of Siemens Mobility, Orascom Construction and The Arab Contractors has signed a contract with the Egyptian National Authority for Tunnels NAT to design, install and commission a 1,800 kilometre high-speed rail network in Egypt. The contract includes the latest rail infrastructure technology, eight depots and yards and a 15-year maintenance agreement. Consortium Finalises Contract to Build Egypt’s High-Speed Rail System© Siemens Mobility When complete, the new high-speed network will become the world’s sixth-largest. It will connect 60 cities across Egypt, enabling approximately 500 million journeys a year on trains that travel up to 230km an hour. Siemens Mobility’s share of the combined contract is billion euros USD, and includes the initial contract for the first line, which was signed by the two organisations last September. Valued at euros USD, this earlier contract is for a 660km-long line that will connect the port cities of Ain Sokhna on the Red Sea to Marsa Matrouh and Alexandria on the Mediterranean. The 1,100 km-long second line will run between Cairo and Abu Simbel near the Sudan border, while the third and final line will link Luxor with Hurghada by the Red Sea via a 225km-long track. The fully electrified network will cut carbon emissions by 70% when compared to current car or bus transport, moving the country closer to achieving its sustainable mobility goals. Roland Busch, President and Chief Executive Officer CEO of Siemens AG, said“The opportunity to provide Egypt with a modern, safe and affordable transportation system that will transform the everyday for millions of Egyptians, create thousands of local jobs and reduces CO2 emissions in transport, is an honour for us. “Not only will it promote economic growth, it will also enable Egypt to take a leap forward in rail transportation. “With our latest technology in rolling stock, signalling and maintenance services, Egypt will have the sixth largest and most modern high-speed rail network in the world. “In addition, it is the biggest order in the history of Siemens!” As part of this project, Siemens Mobility will deliver 41 Velaro eight-car high-speed trains, 94 Desiro high-capacity four car regional train sets and 41 Vectron freight locomotives. It will also install a signalling system based on the ETCS Level 2 technology across all three lines, as well as the power supply system, and its Railigent digital application will also be used to provide asset management and maintenance.
HighSpeed Rail Siemens Mobility Vectron Locomotives Velaro Suppliers Siemens Mobility A consortium made up of Siemens Mobility, Orascom Construction and The Arab Contractors has signed a contract with the Egyptian National Authority for Tunnels (NAT) to design, install and commission a 1,800 kilometre high-speed rail network in Egypt.
Contracts for rolling stock, systems, operation and maintenance as well as construction of the southern section of the line expected to be signed by the end of the Credit Metrolinx INFRASTRUCTURE Ontario and Metrolinx have selected the preferred consortia to deliver the rolling stock, systems, operation and maintenance RSSOM as well as the south section civils, stations and tunnel contracts for the Ontario Line metro in Toronto. The Ontario Line project is estimated to cost $C $US and is structured as a public-private partnership PPP, and will use a design-build-finance model. Connect 6ix is the preferred consortium for the RSSOM contract, which will provide a 30-year design-build-finance-operate-maintain contract for the entire Ontario Line. The group comprises Applicant lead Plenary Americas, Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Salini Impreglio Canada Holding, Transdev CanadaDesign team Hitachi Rail, IBI Group Professional Services CanadaConstruction team Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Astaldi Canada Design & Construction and Salini Impreglio Civil Works, NGE ContractingOperation, maintenance and rehabilitation team Hitachi Rail, Transdev Canada, andFinancial advisors National Bank Financial, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. As part of its work, Hitachi Rail will design, supply and maintain the rolling stock for 30 years. In addition, the consortium will design, build, operate and maintain all track, communications and train control infrastructure and systems for the line, as well as design, build, operate and maintain the depot facility, the operation control centre and back-up operation control centre. NGE Group confirmed that it will supply and install the railway systems and build the depot in a joint venture with Hitachi and Webuild. Webuild says has a €450m stake in the joint venture responsible for the civil works and a 10% stake in Connect 6ix. South section contract Ontario Transit Group is the preferred consortium selected for the Ontario Line South contract, which involves a design-build-finance contract for the southern section of the line running from Exhibition/Ontario Place to the Don Yard portal, west of the Don River. The consortium consists of Applicant lead Ferrovial Construction Canada, Vinci Construction Grands ProjetsDesign team Aecom Canada, Cowi North America, GHD, Sener GroupConstruction team Ferrovial Construction Canada, Janin AtlasFinancial advisor Agentis Capital. The consortium will be responsible for excavating the 6km of tunnels as well as an above ground station that will integrate with the existing Go Transit Exhibition station, two underground stations to integrate with the existing Toronto Transit Commission TTC Osgoode and Queen metro stations, and four new stations at King/Bathurst, Queen/Spadna, Moss Park and Cooktown. The group will also oversee the groundworks required to build the tunnels and stations. Infrastructure Ontario and Metrolinx say both consortia ranked first in the evaluation of their respective request for proposals received in June 2022. Negotiations are continuing to finalise the contract ahead of awarding the contracts by the end of the year, the partners say. Procurement for the North civil major works, as well as enabling works for bridge, track and other preparatory activities, are set to follow. The Enabling Works Three package will include a new “iconic” bridge crossing the Don River Parkway and Don River. Construction on the new Exhibition station got underway earlier this year, effectively marking the start of construction on the Ontario Line, which will comprise 15 stations and will run from Exhibition Place in the west through the city centre to Ontario Science Centre in the northeast. There will be of dedicated track in existing rail corridors, of elevated track and underground. The line is expected to carry 388,000 passengers per day, with a peak frequency of a train every 90 seconds. Journey times are expected to take 40 minutes when the line opens in 2027, compared with the current 70 minutes. The Ontario Line is one of four shovel-ready public transport projects in the Greater Toronto Area GTA in which the Canadian and Ontario governments and the City of Toronto have agreed to invest a total of $C For detailed data on North American rail projects, subscribe to IRJ Pro. HIGHSPEED RAILWAY CONTRACTOR CONSORTIUM 13 - Bandung, Jawa Barat 一、招聘岗位：高级中文翻译 二、需求人数：5人 三、岗位职责： 1.负责文件翻译； 2.协助中方员工与印尼人员沟通； 3.商务谈判、会议翻译等。

Connect 6ix will operate and maintain the Ontario Line for 30 years. The Ontario Line will be a new rapid transit line with 15 stations. Credit Sophia Hilmar from Pixabay. Infrastructure Ontario and Metrolinx have selected Connect 6ix team to design, construct, finance, operate and maintain the Ontario Line Rolling Stock, Systems, Operations, and Maintenance RSSOM package. This contract is valued at C$9bn $ including C$ $ for capital costs. The remaining C$ $5bn will be used for short-term construction financing and transaction costs, train costs, and 30-year operations and maintenance, lifecycle, and long-term financing. The Connect 6ix team includes the applicant lead, Plenary Americas, Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Salini Impreglio Canada Holding, and Transdev Canada, as well as design teams such as Hitachi Rail and IBI Group Professional Services Canada. It also includes the construction teams Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Astaldi Canada Design & Construction and Impreglio Civil Works, and NGE Contracting. The operations, maintenance, and rehabilitation team comprises Hitachi Rail and Transdev Canada, while National Bank Financial and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking are the financial advisers. Connect 6ix will start operating and maintaining the Ontario Line for a 30-year term following the completion of all the civil infrastructure elements and systems from the Ontario Line North and South segments. The new rapid transit line will operate between the Ontario Science Centre and Exhibition/Ontario Place in Toronto. It will have 15 stations, including six interchange stations. It is said to offer 40 connections to other subways, buses, streetcar, light-rail transit, and regional rail services.

Lowongankerja High Speed Railway Contractor Consortium Tipar, Jakarta Saring. Kembali. Nama pekerjaan. Di mana. Kembali Filter Hapus. Sortir berdasarkan Relevansi Tanggal Tipe pekerjaan Semua tipe Purna Waktu Tanggal ditayangkan Kapan saja 30 hari terakhir. Jarak. 10km. Cari. Saring. Lamar sekarang. Sortir berdasarkan. Relevansi. Tanggal.
This article has been translated by PwC Indonesia as part of our Indonesia Infrastructure News Service. PwC Indonesia has not checked the accuracy of, and accepts no responsibility for the content. Investor Daily - Dukungan untuk Wika di proyek kereta cepat 27 October 2021 By Parluhutan Situmorang The government’s decision to finance Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway is positively supporting PT Wijaya Karya Tbk WIKA. The company is also supported by the domestic construction segment that is starting to recover. Wika’s decision to delay the IPO of their two subsidiaries, PT Wika Realty and PT Wika Rekayasa Konstruksi, to 2023 is reckoned to be the right decision by analysts. Moreover, the corporate action aims to secure funds of around Rp3 trillion to Rp4 trillion. BRI Danareksa Sekuritas analyst, Maria Renata, revealed that the government had issued Presidential Regulation Number 93 of 2021, which allowed the government to fund Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project. “The involvement of the government in financing the project can impact the shareholding of consortium members, including Wika’s shareholding that can also be diluted after the appointment of PT KAI as the consortium leader,” she wrote in her research. According to Maria, the government has also assigned Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, to directly supervise the high-speed railway project. “With the appointment and the funding, the construction of the high-speed railway is expected to be progress more quickly, which will positively impact Wika,” she explained. Besides that, Wika will secure a contract worth trillion to construct the project, which is 30% of the total contract. The rest will be divided among 6 to 7 contractors from China. Wika has invested trillion as equity in the project and provided a shareholder loan of trillion. The project construction progress has reached and the construction progress carried out by WIka has reached 82%. The project is set to be finished by the middle of 2022 and to operate by the end of 2022. “KCIC is currently officially calculating the additional cost and [devising] a way to finance the project. Until now, around 75% of the project is financed from loans, which are predicted to increase in line with the investment value increase,” Maria revealed. Those factors are encouraging BRI Danareksa Sekuritas to maintain their buy recommendation for WIKA shares with a target price of Rp1,400. Positive sentiment of the company’s shares came from the government support in the construction Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project and the potential of less company shares in the project. Moreover, Wika’s net profit this year is predicted to increase to Rp274 billion from Rp186 billion last year. The company’s revenue is also predicted to grow from trillion to trillion. Meanwhile, their profit per share is predicted to increase from billion to billion. Meanwhile, Samuel Sekuritas Indonesia analyst, Andreas Kristo Saragih, revealed that Wika’s financial performance would improve in the next three years. This expectation is supported by the double-digit growth of new contracts and the gradual increase of the burn rate. “We also have positive perspective towards Wika thanks to the government’s involvement in resolving the cost overrun issue in the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project, the loss at the early stage of the high-speed railway’s operation, and the project owner’s decision to delay spending,” Andreas wrote in his research. Regarding new contracts, Wika’s compound annual growth rate CAGR can reach until 2023. The increase will be supported by new contracts from SOEs State-owned Enterprises such as Pertamina, Pelindo, PLN and Angkasa Pura that are once again allocating their capital expenditure in activities that are Wika’s specialties. “We also estimate that several new contracts from 2022 to 2023 will come from infrastructure projects in the Capital city,” he explained. Wika will also be supported by their capability to secure additional contracts worth Rp15 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2021. That amount considers the value of tenders that the company are participating in that reaches Rp24 trillion and the estimated value of tenders that will be released by the government and SOEs in the fourth quarter of 2021 that reaches around Rp15 trillion to Rp20 trillion. Several project tenders that Wika are participating in are toll road, smelter, building, dam, and irrigation construction projects. Samuel Sekuritas recommends buying WIKA shares with a target price of Rp1,440. That target price reflects an estimated PE ratio of in 2022. That target price also shows slow financial performance improvement in the next few years until it matches the realisation in the last few years.
PTJakarta Cakratunggal Steel Mills has worked with WIKA under reinforced steel contracts since 2016. Our experience is that PT CS is very cooperative in implementing product order, stock availability, the quality that meets the standard, and competitive pricing. See Our Project Menara-BNI-Pejompongan Tol Trans Sumatera Ruas Bakauheni Skip Nav Destination Article navigation PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSTRUCTION AND BUILDING ENGINEERING ICONBUILD 2017 Smart Construction Towards Global Challenges14–17 August 2017Palembang, Indonesia Previous Article Next Article Research Article November 14 2017 Aleksander Purba; 1Civil Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Lampung University, Jalan Sumantri Brojonegoro No 1 Gedung Meneng, Bandar Lampung 35145, Indonesia Search for other works by this author on Fumihiko Nakamura; 2Graduate School of Urban Innovation, Yokohama National University, 79-1 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama 240-8501, Japan Search for other works by this author on Chatarina Niken DWSBU; 3Civil Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Lampung University, Jalan Sumantri Brojonegoro No 1 Gedung Meneng, Bandar Lampung 35145, Indonesia Search for other works by this author on Muhammad Jafri; 4Civil Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Lampung University, Jalan Sumantri Brojonegoro No 1 Gedung Meneng, Bandar Lampung 35145, Indonesia Search for other works by this author on Priyo Pratomo 5Civil Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Lampung University, Jalan Sumantri Brojonegoro No 1 Gedung Meneng, Bandar Lampung 35145, Indonesia Search for other works by this author on AIP Conference Proceedings 1903, 060004 2017 Split-Screen Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Open the PDF for in another window Tools Icon Tools Search Site High-Speed Railways HSR is currently regarded as one of the most significant technological breakthroughs in passenger transportation developed in the second half of the 20th century. At the beginning of 2008, there were about 10,000 kilometers of new high-speed lines in operation in Asia and Europe regions to provide high-speed services to passengers willing to pay for lower travel time and quality improvement in rail transport. And since 2010, HSR itself has received a great deal of attention in Indonesia. Some transportation analysts contend that Indonesia, particularly Java and Sumatera islands need a high-speed rail network to be economically competitive with countries in Asia and Europe. On April 2016, Indonesia-China consortium Kereta Cepat Indonesia China KCIC signed an engineering, procurement, and construction contract to build the HSR with a consortium of seven companies called the High-Speed Railway Contractor Consortium. The HSR is expected to debut by May 2019, offering a 45-minute trip covering a roughly 150 km route. However, building, maintaining and operating HSR line is expensive; it involves a significant amount of sunk costs and may substantially compromise both the transport policy of a country and the development of its transport sector for decades. The main objective of this paper is to discuss some characteristics of the HSR services from an economic viewpoint, while simultaneously developing an empirical framework that should help us to understand, in more detail, the factors determining the success of the HSR as transport alternative based on current experiences of selected Asian and European countries. REFERENCES de Rus, Economic evaluation of the high-speed rail, University Carlos III de Madrid, pp. 2–3, 2012. Campos, G. de Rus and I. Barron, Economic analysis of high speed rail in Europe Fundacion BBVA, 2009. Levinson, Mathieu, D. Gillen and A. Kanafani, The annals of regional science, 31, pp. 212–213, 1997. de Rus and G. Nombela, Journal of transport economy and policy, 411, pp. 3–23 2007. de Rus and Working paper 590, Institute for Transportation Studies, University of Leeds, 2007. A. Nash, Enhancing the cost benefit analysis of high-speed rail Paper given at the symposium on the environmental and other co-benefits of developing a high-speed rail network in Berkeley California, 2010. Hirota, Japan the Shinkansen effects, Transports, 310, pp. 678–679, 1985. Nakamura and T. Ueda, Proceeding of Fifth World Conference on Transport Research, 3, Yokohama, Japan, 1989 pp. 95– G. Cho and J. K. Chung, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, Special Report 12, pp. 7–13, 2008. Korea Transport Institute KOTI, Modularization of Korea’s Development Experience Construction of high-speed rail in Korea Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea, 2012. Shima, Japan Railway and Transport Review, pp. 40-46, 2007. Barrow, International Railway Journal 2015. Ollivier, J. Sondhi and N. Zhou, China Transport Topics No. 9, pp. 1–2, 2014. Lou and A. Gui, Morgan Stanley Research, pp. 4-10, 2011. Commission EU, High-Speed Europe A sustainable link between citizens Report by Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, Luxembourg, 2010. presentation at TEMPO conference 18-19 May Oslo, 2010. Vickerman, The Annals of Regional Science 31, pp. 21–38, 1997. Leheis, High-Speed train planning in France, lessons from Mediterranean TGV-line World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 20, 2009. International high-speed railway system summary, Spain, pp. 1–2, 2010. high-speed railway system summary, Germany, pp. 1-4, 2010. Galenson and Associates TGA, High Speed Rail Passenger Services World Experience and Applications, 2011. Patuelli, International research society for public management conference, University of Birmingham, pp. 6-8, 2015. dello Stato Italiane, Piano industriale 2014-2017. Italian Railways, Business plan 2014-2017, 2013. p. 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